Based on the theoretical background of the link between countries' transparency and environmental policy our paper provides empirical evidence for a sample of 68 countries for the time period of 2001-2010. By assuming that countries' transparency levels shape their environmental policy which reflects upon their environmental performance levels, we develop an empirical model for investigating such a relationship. By modifying a conditional directional distance function model, we incorporate on the measurement of countries' environmental performance the effect of their public sector transparency levels. The empirical results indicate that public sector transparency has a statistically significant impact on countries' environmental performance with the relation in the case of emerging-developing economies appearing as an inverted 'W' shape, whereas in the case of advanceddeveloped economies indicating an inverted 'U' shape.
Introduction
Corruption is a significant problem of our society and it is spreading across public sector. According to Shleifer and Vishny (1993) bureaucrats are enhanced with the power to manage public properties. If bureaucrats are self interested, they may exploit this power in order to achieve personal gains to the detriment of public interest. This power is referred to as discretionary power (Jain, 2001 ).
Environment and especially environmental regulations is an area where corruption is a common issue. Environmental regulations are imposed and monitored by bureaucrats who may be corrupted and act for their personal interest (Damania, 2002) . According to Bulte et al. (2007) rural subsidies are given to wealthy farmers who either bribe or make political contribution to the officials in order to receive the subsidies. Governments which are more corrupted tend to offer more subsidies to agricultural production and especially wealthy producers against public goods. The authors claim that subsidies are considered as inefficient economic tools for social policy and they are related to low agricultural and land productivity, distortion of the prices and trade, expansion of the rural land and deforestation. Fredriksson (1997) states that subsidies directed to reduce environmental degradation may result to its increase while Lopez and Galinato (2007) argue that government's subsidies either on public or private goods have a significant effect on economic development. If the government reduces subsidies on private goods, ceteris paribus, it will have a positive effect on rural per capita income and it will reduce poverty and environmental degradation. Corruption can lead to environmental degradation in terms of land conversion and as result deforestation (Barbier et al., 2005) . The lower agricultural yields are the greater deforestation will be because farmers need more agricultural land to produce the same level of output as if the agricultural yields were higher and it is possible for them to convert forest land to serve their purpose (Angelsen, 1999) . The author argues that this is true only for poor farmers but Bulte et al. (2007) found that this also stands for wealthy farmers if the government which provides subsidies is corrupted.
A number of scholars point out that economic integration may put pressure on government for less stringent environmental regulations, in favor of the polluting industry and employment (Damania et al., 2003) . Industries which are environmentally non-friendly often form a lobby in order to achieve less stringent environmental regulations and avoid the costs of applying new and cleaner technologies (Damania, 2001) . A corrupted government favors the creation of these special interest groups whose purpose is to extract policy concessions to serve their interests. Political considerations may lead these industries to reject friendly for the environment investments even if they mean lower production costs (Damania, 2001 ). According to there are three aspects that lead to a special interest group's success. Namely, the incentives of the lobby group to offer a bribe, its ability to coordinate bribery and government's willingness to be bribed.
Our paper by following the theoretical models indicating that countries' public corruption levels influence their environmental policies, develops a model in order to provide empirical evidences for such a relationship. Based on the work of Simar and Vanhems (2012) our paper modifies directional distance function model incorporating bad outputs in order to account for the effect of countries public sector corruption levels. More specifically, we propose a conditional directional distance function model with the treatment of bad outputs 1 in productivity analysis, which is conditioned on the effect of countries' public sector transparency levels. As a result we will be able to model the effect of countries' transparency levels on their environmental performance and thus to have a direct measurement of the effect of corruption on countries' environmental policies as has been suggested on the theoretical models by several authors (Damania, 2001 (Damania, , 2002 Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004; .
Literature review
Aidt (1998) demonstrate that competition between special interest groups is significant for the internalization of economic externalities, which combines Coasian and Pigouvian approaches to environmental policy.
According to the Coasian approach, affected groups will act in accordance with their goals. Rather than protecting their interests via private agreements with high transaction costs, they choose political market to minimize them.
According to the Pigouvian approach, a corrupted bureaucrat with discretionary power fulfills the demands of special interest groups to the detriment of public interest. Thus, Aidt (1998) concludes that Coasian and Pigouvian approaches are connected under the public-choice axiom of political self interest. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003) develop an environmental policy theory based on corruption and political instability. According to their theory corruption has a negative effect on the stringency of environmental regulations but this effect fade away as political instability increases. This happens because political instability means that the lobby group may bribe the government but the government may not maintain its power enough to implement the desirable regulation. Corruption related to environmental issues is also more commonly found at developing countries where political instability is higher and institutions are weaker, less effective and more corrupted (Lopez and Mitra, 2000) .
According to Bimonte (2002) quality of institutions positively affects environmental quality. Damania (2002) points out that in developing countries corruption is considered as one of the main factors of environmental degradation. This is a consequence of the way people confront life. According to Arrow (1995) in poor countries material welfare is more important compared to environmental degradation. Desai (1998) finds empirical evidence for the relationship of environmental degradation and corruption by examining ten developing countries. Lopez and Mitra (2000) provide also evidence that corruption increases pollution levels for any given level of income. Bulte et al. (2007) Second, increased coordination costs of the special interest groups means more stringent policies. Third, capital owners and workers have opposite lobbing interests on energy policy. Damania et al. (2003) investigate the relationship between corruption, trade and environmental policy and their results converge with the results of . To be more specific, more corruption results to less environmental stringency although more trade policy liberalization results to more stringent environmental regulations when the level of corruption is high.
According to Fredriksson (1999) several other studies similar to ours (Färe et al., 1989 (Färe et al., , 1996 Färe and Grosskopf, 2003; Chung et al., 1997; Tyteca, 1996 Tyteca, , 1997 Picazo-Tadeo and García-Reche, 2007; Halkos and Tzeremes, 2009) we use two inputs, capital stock 3 and total labour force (in thousands) and two outputs, real GDP (in US Dollars at current prices and current exchange rates in millions) 4 and total CO 2 emissions (in million tones) 5 . Finally our external variable is corruption perception index (CPI) 6 which measures for each country the degree to which public sector's corruption is perceived to exist. following Shephard (1970) and Färe and Primont (1995) . We assume that the output sets are closed and bounded and that inputs are freely disposal. In addition   P x can be an environmental output set if: 3 We have calculated capital stock by using the perpetual inventory method:
Measuring countries' environmental performance
is the gross capital stock in the previous year; t I is the gross fixed capital formation and  represents the depreciation rate of capital stock. In our study, following Zhang et al. (2011) , we set  equal to 6%. 4 Data of capital formation, total labour force and real GDP were obtained from UNCTAD Statistics: http://unctadstat.unctad.org/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx. 5 Data were obtained from two sources: 1) Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center: http://cdiac.ornl.gov and 2) United Nations Statistics Division: http://mdgs.un.org/unsd/mdg/SeriesDetail.aspx?srid=749&crid=. 6 Many studies (Gokcekus and Knörich, 2006; Gokcekus, 2008; Gundlach and Paldam, 2009; Hanousek and Koćenda, 2011 ) have used CPI as a proxy of corruption with a scale from 0 (perceived to be highly corrupt) to 10 (perceived to have low levels of corruption). For details see: http://www.transparency.org/policy_research/surveys_indices/gcb.
e. the outputs are weakly disposable) and
e. the null jointness assumption of good and bad outputs).
In order to formalize the environmental technology we use the data envelopment analysis (DEA) framework.
Let  1,..., k K be the observations and then the environmental output can be formalized as:
K indicate the intensity variables which are not negative and imply constant returns to scale 7 . The inequality on the good outputs and the equality on the bad outputs help us to impose the weak disposability assumption and only strong disposability of good outputs. However the nulljointness is imposed by the following restrictions on bad outputs:
7 Our environmental efficiency measurement follows the most common assumption made in Economics which is the constant returns to scale (CRS) assumption. In addition the CRS assumption provides us with greater discriminative power among the examined countries.
Furthermore, we apply the directional distance function approach as in Chung et al. (1997) 
In this way, the linear programming problem can be calculated as:
Efficiency is next indicated when 
Conditional directional distance functions incorporating bad outputs
In the principles of Daraio and Simar (2005 , 2007 who extent the probabilistic formulation of the production process firstly introduced by Cazals et al. (2002) , let the joint probability measure of   
Moreover the following decomposition can be obtained as:
where
Additionally, let r R Z  denote the exogenous factors to the production process (in our case is countries' transparency levels). Then equation (6) becomes:
which completely characterizes the production process.
According to Daraio and Simar (2005) the following decomposition can be derived:
The estimator of the conditional survival function introduced above can be obtained from:
9 For simplicity of presentation,
being a univariate kernel defined on a compact support (Epanechnikov in our case) and h is the appropriate bandwidth calculated following Bădin et al. (2010) 10 .
Recently Simar and Vanhems (2012) developed the probabilistic characterization of directional distance function taking the general form of:
and the conditional directional distance function of   , x y conditional on  Z z can then be defined as:
Based on these developments the probabilistic form of model (presented previously) measuring country's environmental performance will take respectively the form of:
In addition the conditional form of the model in (13) will take the form of:
Finally, the DEA program for the environmental performance score for a country ' k when using the conditional output oriented directional distance function can be calculated as:
10 The calculation of bandwidth by Bădin et al. (2010) is based on the Least Squares Cross Validation (LSCV) criterion introduced by Hall et al. (2004) and Li and Racine (2007) . 
Determining the effect of countries' public sector transparency levels
In order to identify the effect of countries' public sector transparency levels 11 on the obtained environmental performance levels without specifying in prior any functional relationship, our paper applies a nonparametric regression. Following, Li and Racine (2007) and Racine (2008) let us have a random variable X (countries' public sector corruption levels) with a probability density function (PDF) ( ) f x . Then the Gaussian kernel   K x can be defined as:
and the PDF of ( ) f x can be obtained from:
where h represents the bandwidth calculated by the least squares crossvalidation data driven method as suggested by Hall et al. (2004) .
11 Transparency is the inverse of corruption. Transparency in government is often credited with generating government accountability. Transparency often allows citizens of a democracy to control their government, reducing government corruption, bribery and other malfeasance (Frederick, 2011 (Frederick, , pp. 1346 (Frederick, -1350 
. The joint PDF of ( , ) X Y can be defined as:
where ( , ) The conditional PDF between the two variables accordingly can be obtained from:
Then our nonparametric regression will have the general form of:
but as we don't know the functional form of   . g we will estimate it nonparametrically using kernel methods. In order to obtain the estimation we will need to interpret   It has been shown from Jeong et al. (2010) that the efficiency estimates are consistent (i.e., estimate the true inefficiency). Moreover they have a fast rate of convergence and also the exogenous variable (i.e. countries' transparency levels) is assumed to directly influence the shape of the frontier (i.e., a separability condition is not assumed). Therefore, the obtained efficiency estimates are determined by the inputs, outputs (good and bad) and the exogenous variable (for details see Wilson, 2007, 2011 
.
Empirical results
Following the related theory (Damania, 2001 (Damania, , 2002 Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004; we assume that the shape of countries' environmental production frontier is determined by countries' public sector corruption levels and by the inputs/outputs used. As such the efficiency of countries' environmental policies, which are subject to their public sector corruption levels will be reflected on their obtained conditional environmental performance levels. Table 1 13 Equation (26) represents the local constant estimator introduced from Nadaraya (1964) and Watson (1964) . In order to quantify if the effect of corruption has significant influence on countries' environmental efficiency levels over the years we apply the nonparametric test for equality of distributions between the obtained efficiency scores. Li et al. (2009) created a test for equality of two density or two conditional density functions defined over mixed discrete or continuous data. By using least squares cross-validation techniques for smoothing parameters they illustrate how to use bootstrap methods for obtaining the statistic's null distribution in finite-sample setting. Table 2 illustrates the results obtained following the test of equality.
According to the test the null hypothesis suggests that the distributions under consideration are equal. As can be observed the results indicate that the conditional to countries' corruption levels environmental efficiency scores are having in the majority of the cases unequal distributions over the examined years. 2001-2002, 2003-2005, 2004-2007, 2005-2006, 2007-2008 and for 2009-2010) . In any case the results reveal that during the examined periods variations of countries' environmental performance levels have been occurred which are subject to countries' corruption levels variations over the years (since we are looking at the conditional efficiency estimates).
Moreover, in contrast to table 1 we split our original sample according to IMF Advanced Economies List (2012) into countries forming a sample of advanced/developed economies (24 countries in our case) and into a sample formed by countries from emerging/developing economies (44 countries). Having calculated countries' conditional environmental performances we assume that their transparency levels directly influence the shape of their environmental production frontier (therefore the separability condition is not assumed). In this way we can analyse the influence of countries' public sector transparency levels as has been argued in our theoretical model in a second stage nonparametric regression analysis.
Following Racine (2008) we treat countries' Z EP and their transparency levels as continues variables in a nonparametric regression analysis based upon least squares cross validation (LSCV) criterion for bandwidth selection 14 . Figure 2 presents the results obtained from our nonparametric second stage analysis. Specifically, subfigure 2a presents the underlined relationship for all countries under examination regardless their economic development level. As can be realized for transparency values 14 In addition a bootstrap consistent significance test for continuous regressors introduced by Racine (1997) and Li and Racine (2007) was applied in order to test the significance of countries' public sector transparency levels on their obtained environmental performances. The obtained p-values indicated that transparency is significant at the conventional 5% level for all the samples of our analysis.
between 0 and 2 we observe a positive effect of transparency indicated by an increasing regression line and a positive derivative. However after that point we have a small decrease and again for a large part we have an increasing regression line up to a certain transparency level (4.6). After that point again we observe a decreasing regression line (negative derivative) and then after a certain level of countries' transparency (6) we observe an increasing regression line indicating a positive effect on environmental performance.
A final turning point is reported at 7.4 countries' public sector transparency level whereas after that point and with larger values of countries public sector transparency levels we have a decreasing regression with negative derivative indicating that the effect is negative. As can be realized we have mixed effects of countries' transparency levels due to the fact that the sample contains countries on different development stages. However, we can conclude that our empirical findings support the theoretical models suggested by several authors indicating a nonlinear relationship between countries' corruption levels and environmental quality.
Similarly, subfigure 2b presents the findings for the sample of the advanced-developed countries. As can be realized for a large part of the range of the transparency levels we have a positive influence indicated by an increasing regression line and a positive derivative up to a certain turning point (6.9). After that we have a decreasing regression line indicating a negative effect. As can be observed for the advanced and developed economies we have an indication of an inverted "U" shape relationship between their public sector transparency levels and their obtained environmental performance levels. Finally, subfigure 2c indicates an inverted "W" shape relationship for emerging and developing countries with two distinct turning points (1.9 and 3.6). As can be realized the empirical findings from our nonparametric analysis indicate a nonlinear relationship between environmental performance and public sector transparency levels. 
Conclusions
Our paper proposes an empirical model investigating the relationship between countries' public sector transparency levels and their environmental performance in carbon dioxide emissions. In an empirical nonparametric setting our paper extents the model by and by using the conditional directional distance measures as introduced by Simar and Vanhems (2012) develops a conditional directional distance model measuring countries' environmental performance under the effect of countries' public sector transparency levels.
In a second stage of a nonparametric regression analysis, our results reveal an inverted 'U' shape relationship between advanced and developed countries' environmental performance and public sector transparency levels.
However in the case of emerging-developing countries the relationship between countries' environmental performance and their public sector transparency reveals an inverted 'W' shape.
Our empirical findings provide evidence for several other studies (Damania, 2001 (Damania, , 2002 Damania et al., 2003; Fredriksson and Svensson, 2003; Fredriksson and Millimet, 2004; investigating the relationship between countries' environmental policy and public corruption levels.
